Urban Warfare: U.S. Forces in Future Conflicts

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The U.S. Army's transformation has been predicated on the assumption that the preponderance of future strategic, operational, and tactical missions, whether offensive, defensive, or stability and support operations, will be conducted in urban environments. The assumption is based on the shift, over the past several decades, of populations worldwide into urban areas. Most stability and support operations in urban areas are necessary because of conflicts that arise from the suffering that occurs in the world's densely populated cities.

There is little disagreement about the need to conduct stability and support operations in urban areas; however, is the validity of the assumption that operations will be conducted primarily in urban areas the same when it comes to offensive and defensive operations? If so, should there be an attempt to engage an enemy on predominately urban terrain?

Defense in Urban Terrain

U.S. Army and joint doctrine espouses victory through decisive offensive operations. Can an armed conflict be won through decisive offensive action focused in an urban area? History indicates that the answer is no. Because of its highly restrictive nature, urban terrain is best suited to the defender.

World War II. During World War II, the German High Command fell victim to the belief that the German army could win a decisive victory in an urban setting on the Eastern Front. The Germans had won several victories within Soviet cities, such as Smolensk and Kiev, before being defeated in Leningrad and Stalingrad in 1943.[1] The victories at Smolensk and Kiev had been tactical, however.

At Leningrad and Stalingrad, the Germans sought strategic decisions on the ground outside the cities where the terrain best suited German capabilities.[2] The defenders had opted not to—or simply were unable to—seek a strategic decision any place within the Soviet Union. Arguably, once the Germans decided to make the urban areas decisive, the Soviets were able to grasp the initiative. By attempting to seek a strategic-level decision by attacking both major cities, the Germans ended up losing on all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

The Germans committed the better part of two well-trained, well-equipped, experienced armies—the 6th and the 4th Panzer—at Stalingrad.[3] Despite having a less trained, less technologically advanced force, the Russians halted the attack decisively.

The German advantage in armor and air combat power and technology, primarily in communications, was mitigated within the urban battle space of Stalingrad and Leningrad. The Germans could no longer use the tactics that had so well suited their organization. They lost even more advantage once German Mark III/IV tanks and Stuka ground attack aircraft were tasked to execute offensive tactics in highly restrictive terrain—functions for which they were not designed.

The Russians were able to use the terrain to level the playing field. They had unsuccessfully defended against German armor formations on open plains, but within cities Russian infantry was able to close with German armor. This negated any advantage the Germans enjoyed in firepower and maneuver. In the 1943 pursuit following the encirclement of the 6th Army in Stalingrad, the Russians forced their own strategic-level decision through a counteroffensive but not within the restricted nature of either city.[4]

Vietnam. Another example of failed offensive action on the strategic level is the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) succeeded strategically by seizing key areas in several cities throughout South Vietnam, then by defending them against combined U.S. and South Vietnamese assaults. While the NVA lost the battles on tactical and operational levels through the offense, they were successful strategically through the defense, despite their intent to end the war that year through the use of offensive actions during Tet.[5] The NVA did not win by attacking but by defending and creating mass civilian and military casualties.

U.S. Armed Forces lost because they were forced to attack and remove the defenders from highly restrictive terrain within cities such as Hue. Eventually, U.S. forces won the tactical fight, but only after exposing the U.S. population to the war's brutality, in part because the media can more readily report from urban areas. Tet became a turning point, and seven long years later, U.S. Armed Forces ceded the South after the NVA unleashed a conventional attack to settle the conflict.[6]

Defense in Future Wars

That the U.S. military will face similar problems and results with respect to casualties and collateral damage in future offensive actions in urban areas is safe to assume. No modern force has achieved strategic-level victory through an offensive campaign waged in an urban environment. The simple fact is that doctrine based on offensive action loses tempo in severely restricted terrain. Any technological advantage an armed force might have is mitigated in similarly restricted terrain.

Synchronization and coordination, critical to the combined arms operations necessary to success in any conflict, are difficult to maintain once forces are engaged in combat within urban areas. So, why is the U.S. military preparing to deploy to and execute its offensively weighted doctrine in terrain that is notoriously evil to the attacker?

Casualties. If the U.S. military is involved in a major conflict that features urban combat as an everyday occurrence, it is sorely ill prepared. Historic casualty rates indicate that to attack and seize a defended city with a population of 500,000 would take at least 10 divisions—roughly 200,000 soldiers. After Stalingrad, the 6th Army had committed over 300,000 combat troops to action within the city.[7] To enter such a conflict, current U.S. forces would need to drastically increase force structure and training. Training-up would mean a late entry into the area of operations, thereby defeating the purpose of maintaining an early entry force, or the force would suffer even greater casualties caused by committing an under-trained, undermanned force to the conflict.

Collateral damage. Collateral damage characteristic of high-intensity urban combat will leave modern cities in need of massive amounts of repair. As in the past, the United States would feel compelled to fund repairs. Should the U.S. military avoid seeking a strategic decision through offensive action in urban terrain? Does the U.S. military still lack the will to make the human commitment to such an attack? At the tactical and, in some cases, operational levels, U.S. forces can achieve success in urban attacks while still maintaining acceptable loss of life and materiel.

Winning Urban Conflicts

So how do U.S. Armed Forces win a conflict that features urban combat? One solution is to focus efforts on getting the enemy to fight on U.S. terms on the terrain of choice. At the strategic level, this could involve technologies and actions that would drive enemy forces from the urban area in question.

Controlling the city. By dominating a city strategically, U.S. forces might be able to force an enemy to capitulate or force him to enter terrain where he can be annihilated. Domination would involve isolating the city and controlling major city works such as electricity, water, food sources, commerce, and religious gatherings. Forces can influence these things from a distance or through the limited tactical employment of troops. Control of a city does not necessarily mean its complete seizure and occupation.

Because U.S. strategic objectives are not planned for city areas does not necessarily mean some forces will not be deployed within it. Operational- and tactical-level objectives within the city will be necessary.

Electricity and water can be manipulated from afar, but safe commerce and religious gathering places are difficult to influence without the physical presence of someone holding a weapon. Therefore, U.S. military leaders must be prepared to commit forces at focused tactical- and operational-level objectives while remaining free from wholesale commitment to engagements within cities.

U.S. Armed Forces must be able to enter an urban area rapidly, arrive at the objective, and accomplish the mission without attempting to control the entire area. The objective would not be strategic but be focused on control of the city to force the enemy away from his urban base of operations.

Controlling the people. City populaces can be influenced to help force an enemy from an urban area. One of the reasons the threat will seek refuge in a city is to influence the population and to solicit support. If that assistance is not forthcoming, the enemy has little reason to remain within the city. U.S. Armed Forces alone might be able to encourage local citizens to resist the enemy. Diplomatic and high-level human-intelligence efforts are needed to garner the support of influential groups within a large city.

Strategic urban attack is complex and requires complex strategic courses of action that are deliberate yet flexible and that involve all assets to successfully conduct such an attack. Only in this manner can U.S. Armed Forces hope to force a determined enemy out of the security of restricted terrain.

Controlling the terrain. Tactical-level urban operations should focus on controlling key terrain within the city in order to become the defender. This, coupled with strategic-level domination of the city, would force the enemy to engage in a costly offensive operation. This would make the enemy appear to be the aggressor and the cause of damage to the city's infrastructure. U.S. forces would gain the initiative through the tactical, defensive employment of troops within the city and would maintain that initiative with offensive strategic actions taken external to the city. To survive, the enemy would have to leave the city to seek refuge. Once in the open, a strategic mobile force could confront the enemy on the terrain of its choosing.

Operational-level forces must act as the link between the tactical initiative gained within the city and the maintenance of that initiative at the strategic level. Operational headquarters' primary role would be assisting in the coordination between strategic- and tactical-level headquarters.

Simultaneous actions focused at key points within the city, with the control of electricity and transportation, is an example of an operational-level sequence that could lead to a strategic-level decision. Some operational-level actions would be within the city; others would be external to it. In either case, U.S. forces must avoid a strategic-level commitment until they had successfully forced the enemy from the safety of the city's restrictive terrain.

Transformation of Forces

The transformation of U.S. forces must take into account equipment and organizational changes as well as changes in accomplishing strategic goals within urban terrain. The Germans were excellent tacticians; their force structure was the personification of their tenets of mobile offensive warfare at all levels. But, as they

approached the gates of Stalingrad, they did not perceive the mismatch of strategic goals with their army's tactics and organization.

U.S. Armed Forces might soon encounter a conflict within a large metropolitan area. U.S. military leaders must ensure that tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure for dealing with such an inevitability are adequate to meet the challenge. ***MR***

NOTES

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MR Almanac

North Africa: The Alhucemas Bay Landings

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Spain's defeat by the United States in 1898 during the Spanish-American War highlighted the deplorable state of Spain's armed forces. The army's bloated, often-incompetent officer corps oversaw a mass of poorly trained, fed, and equipped conscripts. With the loss of its colonial empire in the Americas and Asia, Spain could only seek military glory in the Moroccan territories of Ceuta and Melilla.[1]

There is little doubt that the uncompromising determination of the Spanish military to use the 1909 Moroccan war to revive its flagging reputation effectively forced the Spanish government to underwrite a long, costly military involvement in North Africa. But the army's turnaround was a gradual process. Intermittent conflict with various Moroccan tribal groups persisted for more than a decade. Over this period, the Spanish army introduced many innovations, and it evolved into a fully professional force instead of the conscript army that had performed so imperfectly in Cuba in 1898.

Innovations were primarily of an organizational nature. Two professional forces were created: the *regulares*, Moorish volunteer troops led by a group of up-and-coming Spanish officers, and the Spanish Foreign Legion—the shock troops for what remained of the Spanish empire.[2]

Despite its improvement, in July 1921, the Spanish army suffered a humiliating rout at Annual, Morocco, at the hands of Abd el-Krim, leader of the Rif tribesmen. Spanish commander General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, underestimating his opponent's strength, spread his troops across a series of mutually unsupportable posts as he approached Krim's stronghold. Silvestre, directly responsible for the loss of 8,000 Spanish soldiers, committed suicide.

The timely arrival of Spanish reinforcements during the rout prevented the loss of the Melilla enclave and the port itself. During the next few years, the Spanish slowly, but with difficulty, reconquered the lost territory.

The Bay Operation

In April 1925, Krim's forces overran a number of French forts, threatening the city of Fez. The French sent General Henri Pétain to Morocco to meet with Spanish military dictator Primo de Rivera. Together, they finalized the plans for a combined operation against the Riffians.[3] They agreed to a strategic pincer plan where the French would contribute 160,000 men to attack northward by land toward the Riffian capital and stronghold of Ajdir. Spain would contribute 75,000 men, with approximately 18,000 landing at Alhucemas Bay and 57,000 attacking from Spain's Melilla enclave.[4] Alhucemas Bay was chosen because of its proximity to Krim's stronghold and to the Rif heartland from which he drew his strength.

As the targeted date in September 1925 approached, the three branches of the Spanish military made preparations. The land forces would be composed of two brigades, one sailing from Ceuta, the other from Melilla. The elite Spanish Foreign Legion would hit the beach first, with five battalions split between the two brigades. The Spanish navy would depart from Cartegena, Spain, and the entire Spanish air force would be distributed between the airdromes of Ceuta and Melilla. The French fleet would sail from Oran and join the Melilla convoy.[5]

The operation demonstrated the factors essential for successful amphibious landings:

Deception as to the intended landing area.

Reconnaissance of the landing areas by air.

Use of air power to provide support for the landing waves of infantry.

Synchronized naval support from a combined fleet.

Use of top-notch infantry forces in the lead assault waves when establishing a beachhead.

Deception. To mislead the Riffians as to the intended landing area, two Spanish Foreign Legion battalions made demonstration-landing attempts at several locations while the combined fleets bombarded coastal targets to give credence to the deception plan. Abd el-Krim expected the landings to take place at Alhucemas Bay and arrayed his defenses accordingly, but Spanish troops landed west of the bay in a

poorly defended area. During World War II, a similar situation would confront the German army. Would the Allies land at Pas de Calais or Normandy?

Air reconnaissance. The overall commander of the Spanish operation, General José Sanjurjo Sacanell, reconnoitered the western part of the bay by air to gain an overview of Riffian fortifications. In 1925, using airplanes for military purposes was still gaining acceptance in some European countries. Aerial reconnaissance became the norm during World War II.

Air power. At 0600 on 8 September 1925, the invasion began with a naval and aerial bombardment of the beaches at La Cebadila and Ixdain. Both the navy and air force were critical to the success of the landing infantry. The Spanish air force supported the landings by providing reconnaissance, artillery spotting, bombardment, and strafing runs, flying 1,462 flight hours and dropping 330,000 pounds of bombs.[6]

Naval support. The coast was subjected to intense naval gunfire from the Franco-Hispano squadron of 38 Spanish ships and 8 French ships. Considering that this operation occurred in 1925 and was led by a traditionally weak military power, the amount of joint firepower used and the coordination it required is impressive.

Top-notch infantry. The Spanish Foreign Legion, the country's most highly qualified infantry soldiers, assaulted the beach to gain and maintain the beachhead. At 1140, the first battalion headed toward the beach, where legionnaires jumped out of their landing boats and waded ashore. By sundown, the Legion had secured a high point near Ixdain beach. By then, 8,000 men and three batteries had been put ashore.

After the Legion repelled a determined Riffian counterattack on 11-12 September, the beachhead was secured.[7] The fight toward Ajdir could begin. The use of the Spanish Foreign Legion, Spain's crack troops for the spearhead, foreshadowed U.S. use of Ranger companies and Marines for amphibious assaults during World War II. The clear lesson is that securing the beachhead and critical points that dominate the landing site must be entrusted to elite troops capable of successfully accomplishing such missions.

Victory for Spain

Alhucemas Bay was a great victory for Spain—the only definitive one it was to achieve during the Rif War.[8] There may be several reasons why this operation has been overlooked in the study of combined operations and amphibious landings:

As a European nation, Spain was a weak military power throughout the early part of the 20th century.

Spain's army contributed little to new military doctrine and technology during World War I.

As World War II approached, German and Soviet military developments overshadowed those of Spain.

During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Germany and Russia used Spain as a testing ground for the new tactics and equipment they were developing.

Spain did not participate actively in World War II.

The amphibious French and Spanish operation at Alhucemas Bay provides military historians and students of joint and combined operations with a seminal case with which to preview World War II's larger amphibious operations. Many of the essential factors for success in more-studied amphibious battles of World War II were first used at Alhucemas Bay. ***MR***

NOTES

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Poisoned Clouds Over Deadly Streets: Grozny, December 1999-January 2000

Adam Geibel©

Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) are nasty enough without adding chemical or toxic weapons to the mix. However, desperate defenders will often use whatever assets are available, particularly when the fight is driven by passionate ideology as during the Third Battle of Grozny, Chechnya, from December 1999 to January 2000.

The original Russian plan for the siege of Grozny was for troops to stop at the Terek River to create a *cordon sanitaire*. The plan evaporated before the siege began. Grozny's defenders created the mother of all command detonated mines when they rigged chemical-filled cisterns, barrels, and bottles to use as remote-controlled land mines along likely avenues of approach, under bridges, on traffic signals, above highways, and on trees.

On 25 October 1999, the pro-Mujahidin *Kavkaz-Tsentr* web site reported that Russian strikes against nuclear waste dumps, chemical installations, and other sites could lead to an environmental catastrophe in the entire Caucasus-Caspian-Black Sea region.[1] The same day, ITAR-TASS reported that reconnaissance units observed Chechen fighters building unusual works in Grozny along routes that Federal (Russian) forces would most likely take on the attack. The report said, "Trenches are being dug alongside bridges, and barrels filled with an unknown liq-

uid are being placed on roadsides. Interestingly, those carrying out these works are observing all safety precautions and wearing protective suits and gas masks."[2] The Russians concluded that the *boyeviki*—the term used for nominally Wahhabite Islamic fighters—had placed the chemical-filled containers along the most likely avenues of advance for later detonation by remote control.

Simultaneously, Federal Security Service (FSB) spokesman Aleksandr Zhdanovich noted that Chechen fighters might deliberately destroy petrochemical plants or supplies in Grozny in order "to devastate the environment."[3] ORT, the Russian Public Television Station, and Novosti, the Russian Information Agency, also reported Moscow's claim that the Chechens were planning to use mustard gas.[4]

In early November, ITAR-TASS quoted Alexander Kharchenko, a top Russian defense ministry official, who denied the presence in the North Caucasus of any Russian ammunition filled with toxic agents.[5] A flood of reports followed, establishing the extent of the expected Mujahidin chemical *fougasses* defenses. According to Russian reports on 4 November 1999, Mujahidin wearing protective clothing were seen removing containers of radioactive waste from special deep wells on the grounds of Grozny's "Red Hammer" factory.[6] Deputy chief of staff General Valeri Manilov claimed that from 15 to 17 November, boyeviki in Grozny's Zavodskoi district were busy mining several underground cisterns that contained chlorine, ammonia, and oil byproducts.[7] Later, Russian military sources stated that on 28 November, the Chechens were building a multiline defense around Grozny and Argun, digging fortifications, and burying barrels that contained chemicals and flammable substances.[8]

At 0045, 6 December 1999, witnesses reported seeing "a strange yellow smog" after something exploded in two areas of Grozny.[9] The Chechens claimed that the Russians had shelled the Oktiabrskij and Avturchanovskij wards and that the rounds had been filled with an unknown chemical substance.[10] The first casualties were 47-year-old Marat Irischanov and his 15-year-old daughter Zina. By 0600, 31 people had died and more than 200 had been injured. Reported symptoms included blisters on the skin, slowed reactions, and confusion.

On 7 December, the Chechens claimed that the Russian ultimatum to Grozny was really to allow Federal forces the chance to start a chemical-weapons offensive against Mujahidin positions. This information allegedly came from a Russian special forces soldier captured in the town of Urus-Martan. The soldier said there were two Russian special chemical warfare units deployed around Grozny awaiting orders from Moscow to begin using chemical weapons.[11]

On 10 December, Russia's military again accused the Mujahidin of blowing up oil products or chemicals in Grozny while rejecting allegations it had used chemical weapons itself. Chief of staff of Russian forces in Chechnya Alexander Baranov said that "at around 1215 in Grozny, in the area of Khankala, there was an explosion.... We believe it was prepared from supplies of oil products, chlorine, or ammonia.... We believe that the aim of this act by the bandits was first and foremost to blame the Federal forces for using weapons of mass destruction and poisons."[12] The Russian military believed the Mujahidin had timed the 10 December blast to coincide with the Helsinki Summit so they could charge the Russian military with using weapons of mass destruction or toxic materials.

Accusations and Denials

Baranov noted that the cloud from the blast went up 200 to 300 meters in the air then drifted in the direction of the "safe corridor" left open in the Staropromyslovsky district for Grozny's refugees. The Russian press mentioned that ammonia is heavier than air and might therefore seep into the cellars where civilians were taking refuge. Baranov also noted that military forces had been given the task of providing "whatever assistance they can, primarily medical assistance, to anyone who may have been poisoned."[13] He predicted that the cloud would dissipate within two or three hours and the danger would disappear.

Responding to *Krasnaya Zvezda* Correspondent Oleg Falichev's question as to whether the Russians would respond in kind to the Mujahidin's use of chemical weapons, medical service Major General Nikifor Vasilyev, chief of the Russian Federal Ministry of Defense Radiological, Chemical, and Bacteriological Defense (RKhBZ) Troops Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Safety Directorate, replied, "No, it doesn't mean that. Under no circumstances will Federal troops do that. We will not resort to that under any conditions whatsoever."[14] In answer to a similar question at a 15 November press conference, Vasilyev said, "The very thought that Russian troops may use chemical weapons is absurd."[15]

When asked if the Mujahidin could have chemical warfare supplies, Vasilyev said that there were none in their hands nor were there any—in the traditional sense—within Chechen territory. However, he did not rule out the possibility that "foreign extremist groups" could have delivered chemical-warfare supplies. However, Vasilyev believed there were about 160 tons of ammonia and 60 tons of chlorine in 11 plants throughout Chechnya and that the Mujahidin's possession of protective gear, including gas masks, indicated that they planned to use toxins.

Precaution and Protection

Conversely, with the beginning of hostilities in the North Caucasian region, the protection of Russia's 40,000 tons of chemical weapons stored in seven arsenals had been increased to limit the possibility of any falling into Mujahidin hands. In contrast to earlier Russian concerns, Vasilyev was skeptical about the possibility that Mujahidin fighters would or could create radioactive contamination zones in Chechnya. He noted that a site 30 kilometers northeast of Grozny where radioactive wastes were buried was the most dangerous from the viewpoint of radiation; however, there had been no hostilities in the area, and the territory was guarded by interior troops.

Several Federal army units had been equipped with gas masks and protective clothing for the assault on Grozny, which began in earnest in mid-December. However, rather than driving into kill zones as Federal forces did during the First Battle

of Grozny (December 1994-April 1995), the Russians cautiously probed for Mujahadin positions. On finding them, air and artillery support was called in to eliminate the problem. A Russian defense ministry spokesman admitted the push was hampered by fierce defensive fire and minefields, both conventional and chemical.

On 23 December, General Mumadi Saydayev, head of the Mujahidin's operational defense headquarters, reported that Russian chemical defense troops were concentrating on the outskirts of the capital and that a large quantity of chemical weapons had recently been moved to the city.[16] Whether this was a legitimate report, a misidentification of a Russian flame-thrower unit, or the establishment of "plausible deniability" for blowing chemical fougasses is unknown. Saydayev claimed that the Russians had already used toxic substances in the Dzhokhar district, killing more than 60 civilians and wounding around 200 more.

Russian experts said that a container filled with chlorine exploded right after midday on 29 December in a northeast district of Grozny. A thick cloud of white gas spread over the entire city. Colonel Yevgeny Kukarin, leading a mechanized infantry unit, received a radio report that a cloud of gas was drifting toward his unit. Kukarin ordered a chemical alert, figuring that the boyeviki might have been trying to break out, and ordered the tactical operations center to determine the wind speed and direction. When the weather unit did not respond, Kukarin's men launched a flare with which to determine the wind's direction. British journalist Marcus Warren, of the *Electronic Telegraph*, witnessed the event.[17] The suspicious cloud drifted over Mujahidin lines and dissipated. No cases of poisoning were reported later that day.

The next day, the Chechens claimed that the Russians had used napalm and chemical weapons in their onslaught in southern Chechnya. Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, head of the Russian Chemical, Radiation, and Biological Defense Force, countered that the "rebels are acting without restraint, which puts the lives of the civilians still in the town under threat. . . . The Russian servicemen have all the necessary means for individual defense."[18]

On the morning of 31 December, Russian units reported that after a Chechen mortar attack (of two shells) a chemical cloud "smelling of ether" covered their positions in the Khankala suburb. Federal troops donned protective gear again, but as with the attack on 29 December, Russian forces reported no casualties. Russian Lieutenant General Vladimir Bulgakov, speaking from within Grozny, sternly warned the fighters against resorting to the use of chemical weapons.

Accusations Resume

The Russians and the Mujahidin also traded accusations of chemical-weapons use on 2 January 2000. Russian regional headquarters warned that the Mujahidin had set off several chlorine/ammonia mines overnight on 1 January near Russian positions in the east but that the wind had blown the green cloud over the city's center. The troops were equipped for chemical attacks.

The Chechens specifically cited Russian strikes in the Staropromyslovsky district and Khankala, with both chemical-filled artillery shells and aircraft bombs. They asserted that Russian allegations of the use of chemical fougasses by the Mujahidin were designed to lull the public so the Russians could massively retaliate with chemical weapons against the Chechens.

Both sides noted the danger to the thousands of civilians trapped in central Grozny. On 5 January the Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov called for a three-day cease-fire throughout Chechnya from 9 through 11 January.[19] A Chechen representative in Georgia sent Maskhadovi's appeal to Russian leaders. Maskhadov said the cease-fire was needed because of the critical level of chemical contamination in Grozny from the Russian air bombardment of the chemical plant and the use of chemical weapons by Russian forces.

Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who had been commanding Russian operations in eastern Chechnya, told the press on 7 January that the order to suspend the Grozny offensive had been motivated by the need to protect civilians from toxic chemicals being used by the Mujahidin to slow the Russian advance.[20] Troshev was replaced that same day by his deputy, General Sergei Makarov. ITAR-TASS added that Russian attacks would continue on other parts of the city where civilians would not be in danger.[21] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) correspondent Rob Parsons pointed out that another explanation could be that deteriorating weather conditions were making impossible the effective use of Russian air power and artillery.[22]

Weapons Build-up

The Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations sent a unique "chemical-control complex" developed by Russian researchers to Grozny. An 11 January press release promised the system would be in Chechnya by 1 February.[23] The complex was made available for delivery to the North Caucasus by the Moscow Department for Civil Defense and Emergency Situation, with final testing and personnel train-up conducted in Noginsk near Moscow.

Developed by the Moscow Research Institute of Precision Instrument-building, the complex was first demonstrated at the Rescue Systems '97 Exhibition in Moscow. The light detection and ranging (LIDAR) mobile measuring complex, mounted on a ZIL-131 truck, can conduct around-the-clock detection of airborne toxic agents, including chlorine and ammonia. LIDAR, a remote-sensing method, uses laser light pulses in a manner similar to how radar uses radio pulses. Images, with their ranges from the observer, can be obtained.

Mobile LIDAR systems (MLS), based on Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL), are powerful tools that can provide 3-dimensional mapping of pollutant concentrations, estimate toxic-compound emissions, detect individual sources of atmospheric pollution, and measure pollutants at relatively high altitudes over soil levels. One on-board sub-

system, with an attached laboratory, can locate a pollution source, predict the movement of toxic clouds, and make recommendations on how the population should be defended. On 21 January, Chief of the Russian Emergencies Ministry's Chechen Radiation, Chemical, and Bacteriological Protection service, Colonel Vladimir Denisov, told ITAR-TASS that nearby chlorine mines posed no threat to Russian troops.[24] He believed, however, that civilians near the site who had no time to take adequate measures were in danger. Eleven more chlorine tanks were discovered in Grozny's Zavodskoi district on 22 March.

The Russian Emergencies Ministry participated in defuzing explosive devices and clearing Chechnya from chemically dangerous objects. By the end of December 2000, 57 containers of chlorine and ammonia had been rendered harmless. Roughly one-third of these containers had to be defuzed because the Mujahidin had rigged them for detonation. Ministry services also cleaned up the sites of three chemical blasts, which they blamed on the Mujahidin.

The chemical fougasses also became a losing battle for Moscow in the information war. The deluge of reports in the Western press about Russian use of chemical weapons was followed by threats of European Union (EU) sanctions and the withdrawal of Council of Europe status. Major General Boris Alekseyev, chief of the Russian Armed Forces Information Center's ecological safety department, argued that Russia did not use chemical weapons and that such accusations were nothing but rebel propaganda. Whether or not Russian forces used chemical weapons is moot since the perception that they did has remained.

The threat of toxic-weapons use continued to hang over Grozny. On 15 August, FSB counterintelligence officers claimed to have an audio recording of a conversation between Mujahidin field commander Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov and "Khizir Alkhazourov," allegedly one of the Mujahidin's envoys abroad. Chitigov asked Alkhazourov, who was in the United Arab Emirates, to prepare a manual for making toxic substances using materials at hand so that later those substances could be used against the Russian army. The Mujahidin wanted something to "smear on bullets and fragments" so that the probability of killing Russians would increase with even a grazing hit.[25] The Russians supposedly raided one of Chitigov's caches and found a handbook for "chemical terrorists" that specified in detail how to make five types of toxic substances for mass application. These were primarily tactile in nature—short-lived contact poisons and coatings for grenades.

Ironically, it was Chitigov who was allegedly responsible for rigging Grozny's chemical fougasses. Chitigov had once lived in the United States and had participated in the infamous 1995 raid on Budennovsk. This seems to have been the basis for FSB spokesman Zdanovich's April 2001 accusation that Chitigov was an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chitigov, also known as "Suraka," was one of "Khattab's" trusted men. His group, which mustered from 50 to 500 Mujahidins, specialized in laying mines in Chechnya, Ingushetiya, and Osetiya. They cooperated with groups under Maskhadov, Khattab, warlord Shamil Basayev, and Chechen General Magomed Khambiyev. The Russians also think that Suraka attempted to bring shipments of remote detonators from Georgia into Chechnya.

Magomadov Abubakar, who was a member of the rebel Chechen parliament and chairman of the defense and security committee, claimed that the "Chechen state had never had chemical weapons on its territory and that only Russians have always had them and used them against civilians in Chechnya, violating international conventions."[26] He specifically mentioned Russian use of chemical weapons in Grozny, and that Russian, Ukrainian, and Armenian civilians suffered.

Implications for the U.S.

For U.S. and allied commanders, a scenario such as was played out in Chechnya provides a lesson and a warning for the future. U.S. and allied forces must support aggressive strategic and tactical nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance. Effective reconnaissance must be backed by decontamination teams, and nongovernmental operations must be prepared to deal with civilian refugees caught in any chemical discharges. Everyone must work with public affairs officers to maintain transparency and to ensure that all pertinent information reaches those who will be affected. ***MR***

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MR From My Bookshelf

Crisis in Global Security: The Middle East

Lieutenant Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Many books have been written within the last few years warning of impending crises in global security in the Middle East. The following books are ones I find to be especially interesting in light of current events.

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan, Michael Griffin, Pluto Books, Sterling, VA, 2001, 283 pages, $27.50. In this book, Michael Griffin details the evolution of the Taliban, who practice a brand of Diobandi-Wahabi Islam foreign to most Muslims. Griffin spent time in Afghanistan as a consultant for UNICEF and is a well-traveled freelance writer.

The first mention of the word *talib* in the vocabulary of the Mujahidin surfaced during the Soviet-Afghanistan War. Of the dozen factions fighting the Soviets, a few actively solicited the aid of the talib—students of Islamic schools based in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. The talibs, soon to be known as the Taliban, were a breed apart from the rest of the fighters because the talibs saw the battle as being a "holy war."

The war offered fighters a chance for revenge and, through plundering and looting, a way to feed their families. Some Mujahidin joined the fight then returned to their homes; others fought for profit. The talibs fought and were willing to die for their fellow Afghans and were not averse to losing their own lives in order to kill as many Soviets as they could or to change the course of battle. The most widely recognized equivalent to the talibs' attitudes can be found in the actions of the Japanese kamikaze during World War II. In 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and the majority of talibs returned to their schools.

The Taliban whirlwind began as a result of the nation's lawlessness and the continuous squabbles between Tajiks, Pushtuns, Shites, Uzbeks, and others vying for control. Many commanders whose troops pillaged cities and raped villagers were cornered by the Taliban and hanged or decapitated.

Griffin gives an excellent description of Taliban tactics, comparing them to those of Ahmed Shah Masood, former leader of the Northern Alliance, and Gilbuddin Hekmetyar, leader of the Islamic Party. The Taliban, which was a rapid-deployment force, used pickup trucks, cellular phones, and wireless radios to coordinate ground attacks. The belief that they were on a moral crusade against Muslims who had gone astray made them able to subdue most of Afghanistan by 1996.

Griffin describes what was then known about the Taliban's global network, including its contacts with Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization as well as contacts with the governments of Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: The Politics of Revenge, Saïd K. Aburish, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2001, 406 pages, $13.95. The crisis in Afghanistan, which led to the Taliban's rise, was only one flashpoint in the Middle East. Saïd Aburish is one of a pantheon of modern Arab writers, such as Fouad Ajami and Edward Saïd, who live and publish in the West but who bring an Arab perspective to the problems and issues of the modern Middle East. Whereas Ajami and Saïd are academics and more scholarly in their outlook, Aburish is earthy in his descriptions and looks into a regime's anatomy, including its leadership and its peoples.

In *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge,* Aburish tells of Hussein's humble beginnings in the small village of Awja, his fatherless childhood, and his rough life with a stepfather (known as Hassan the Liar) he still refuses to acknowledge.

The chief influences during Hussein's childhood and teenage years were his mother and his uncle Khairullah Tulfah. Tulfah, an Iraqi army officer who introduced Hussein to the evils of colonialism in Iraq, was imprisoned by the British for his activism against the English-backed monarchy of King Feisal I.

Aburish eloquently brings to life the violent means by which Iraqis have fomented revolutions and crushed dissent. This is a subject of poetry, jokes, and criticism among Arabs, and Hussein used the subject as a way to propagate an air of toughness. The *Baath* (renaissance) Party, which Muslim Salah Bitar and Christian Michel Aflaq originally established, became a vehicle for Hussein. He became an enforcer for the party, and like Joseph Stalin, who fascinated Hussein, he left the intellectuals behind and climbed the ladder of Iraq politics, using a combination of intimidation, fear, nepotism, and outright murder.

In 1958, Feisal's monarchy came to a bloody end, and General Adel Karim Kasim took power. A year later, Hussein participated in a failed attempt on Kasim's life. Hussein was exiled to Egypt, where he became enamored of President Gamal abd-al-Nasser, who espoused Arab nationalism. Hussein was also instrumental in organizing Baath cells at the University of Cairo.

In 1963, General Abdel-Rahman Arif overthrew Kasim, and the Baaths were back in power. But,

trouble was brewing in Baghdad as communists and Baaths fought for control of Iraq. By 1968, Arif's vice president, General Hassan al-Bakr, a relative of Hussein, took power. Hussein was put into control of the internal security apparatus, and within a decade, he had created a police state within Iraq that was so oppressive that it has often received criticism from moderate Arab states.

When Hussein became president of Iraq, he slowly undermined the Shiite majority to attain power for the Baath Party, giving top leadership positions to relatives and close associates. The book's final chapters detail events that led to the Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf wars.

Aburish's book is an excellent, balanced biography that cuts through the myths to explore Hussein's complex Machiavellian world. Another Aburish biography I recommend is *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator* (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998). Together, these books provide an understanding of the events that have occurred during the past two decades.

THE GREATEST THREAT: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, Richard Butler, PublicAffairs, New York, 2000, 262 pages, $26.00. Richard Butler led the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), formed in the mid-1990s, whose mission was to oversee the inspection program designed to ensure the disarmament or destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Butler's book is a lesson in the delicate art of negotiating with members of Iraq President Saddam Hussein's inner circle to effect an agreement about disarmament between Iraq and Western powers.

Iraq Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz occupies center stage. Butler describes Aziz's endless monologues, irrational temper, and outright deception in his accountability to the United Nations. When Butler became the leader of the commission, the outgoing UNSCOM leader, Rolf Ekeus, remarked that he had found "Iraqi leaders to be a gang of despicable liars and cheats." Butler echoes Ekeus's words when he describes physical threats from a regime that operates with no rule of law.

The many attempts at Iraqi deceit forced UNSCOM to act as detectives; witnesses described Iraqis running out of buildings carrying armloads of incriminating documents as UNSCOM inspectors approached. In another instance, Butler's team discovered Agent VX, a deadly toxin, in fragments of destroyed missiles. After first denying its manufacture, the Iraqis eventually admitted to having made 200 liters of the deadly substance. Further probing by UNSCOM showed that the Iraqis had actually manufactured 3.9 metric tons of the agent.

Butler does not have kind words to say about the U.N. either. In particular, he has harsh words for Security Council members from China, France, and Russia, who tried to dismantle the weapons-inspection program. Butler feels that these nations merely wished to open markets because of Hussein's ambition to possess weapons of mass destruction. Possessing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons would enhance Hussein's image as a defender of Arab pride and causes. Butler met senior Iraqi army officers who were callous about using such agents during the Iran-Iraq War. They blatantly told him: "When you have an insect problem, you use insecticide."

UNSCOM was dismantled when the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created. Aaccording to Butler, UNMOVIC is composed mostly of diplomats and has few technical experts. The U.N. Secretary General and the Security Council directly control UNMOVIC; therefore, UNMOVIC has less autonomy than did UNSCOM.

Other recent books about Hussein's incessant drive to possess weapons of mass destruction are *Brighter Than the Baghdad Sun* by Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGrory (Regnery Publishers, Washington, D.C., 2000) and *Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda* (see below) co-authored by Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein. Hamza defected from Iraq after 20 years of helping develop Iraq's atomic weapons program. These books demonstrate that the current regime in Iraq has no intention of complying with U.N. demands and has actually succeeded in circumventing and watering down U.N. resolutions to disarm.

SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Scribner, New York, 2000, 352 pages, $14.00. In 1994, Khidhir Hamza was smuggled out of Iraq by a Kurd. He sought refuge with the Iraqi opposition based in that region. Ahmad al-Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, put Hamza in touch with U.S. intelligence experts to whom he revealed Iraq's intricate plans for constructing a nuclear bomb.

Hamza's book offers valuable insight into Saddam Hussein's cravings to possess nuclear capabilities. Hussein, whose push to gain a nuclear weapon was driven initially by the Iran-Iraq War and his desire for an equalizer by which to deal with Iranian human-wave attacks, has spent large amounts of money on this long-term project. His desire evolved into an obsession to acquire weapons of mass destruction, possession of which would allow him to usurp the mantle of Arab national causes from moderate states like Egypt and to counter the Israelis.

Hamza's highly narrative style focuses mainly on his relationship with Hussein's inner circle, the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, and key figures within the Iraqi WMD program. He takes readers into an erratic world where Hussein controls scientists and advisers using the carrot-and-stick approach. Hamza also gives glimpses of clandestine operations designed to lure Baghdad into pursuing behind-closed-doors bargaining for fissile material. Such tactics often led the Iraqis to invest in useless projects. Hamza also witnessed the Israeli

attack on the Osirak Nuclear Plant in 1981, and he discusses the partial destruction of Iraq's WMD program during Operation Desert Storm.

Hamza allows us to sit in on the meeting where the chief of the Iraqi air force criticized General Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law. The chief said that Kamil was risking pilots' lives by equipping them with bombs that did not explode. The chief's reward was a torture cell for daring to criticize one of Hussein's relatives. There is also the tragic story of an Iraqi junior officer who calmly argued the tactical prudence of cutting the Iranian line and flanking the infantry versus conducting a disastrous head-on assault. His reward was a bullet fired by Hussein within the command and control tent.

Saddam's Bombmaker should be required reading for anyone interested in the Middle East, but all the books reviewed in this article will prove valuable to anyone who wants to know more about the seminal events that led to the recent attacks on America. ***MR***

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MR Book Reviews

CLOSER THAN BROTHERS: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy, Alfred W. McCoy, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2000, 416 pages, $40.00.

In *Closer Than Brothers,* Alfred W. McCoy presents a prosopography of two Philippine Military Academy (PMA) classes: 1940, its first; and 1971, its most controversial. Both classes faced similar political decisions that they collectively and individually handled in markedly different ways. McCoy asks these questions:

How is an officer corps socialized?

What factors promote the socialization's collapse?

Why did these two groups of young men, who graduated from the same school under similar curricula, turn out so differently?

Of course, McCoy realizes that the simple answer to all the questions is that internal and external factors unique to each class determine different outcomes. Each class might be subjected to rigorous drill, discipline, and indoctrination, but its mix of personalities and values, influenced by society's political values and the ruling government's political agenda, make it unique.

The class of 1940 came of age during the Philippines' colonial era (1898-1935). The U.S. Army encouraged the Commonwealth government to create an officer corps in its own image—one that was professional but apolitical. From 1945 through the 1970s, the United States regarded the Philippines as a showcase for democracy and discouraged professional officers' political ambitions.

In the 1970s, however, the United States increased support to Ferdinand Marcos' constitutional coup with the attendant politicization of the officer corps. In the 1980s, the United States turned against the Marcos government and supported Corazon Aquino, which contributed to the rash of unsuccessful coups led by the class of 1971.

McCoy also concentrates on other variables, including the differing images of masculinity the two classes carried with them and the corrosive effects of politicization on military socialization and professionalism. He also grapples with problems inherent in comparative studies. Although certain external features are comparable, individuals cannot be easily separated from their own contemporary cultural contexts. Does this mean comparative historical works are futile? McCoy would vigorously deny this; although there are similarities, they can cloak profound differences.

McCoy's interesting, thought-provoking issues include the causes of coups d'etat, military socialization, and how torture affects its practitioners. The group biographies are also fascinating. McCoy highlights successes and failures as well as the ways in which cultural change affects institutions.

Lewis Bernstein, ***Historian, Huntsville, Alabama***

THE BLOODY FOREST: Battle for Hüertgen, September 1944-January 1945, Gerald Astor, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 393 pages, $29.95.

The Battle for Hüertgen Forest—a costly, ill-advised battle—provides a strong argument against attrition warfare. The battle had no apparent designated operational or sound tactical objectives. U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower advocated a broad-front approach. Most senior leaders felt that the war would be over by Christmas if they were to conduct a continuous push through this inhospitable terrain. However, their desire for an early end to the war did not justify the callous destruction of soldiers and fighting units.

In *The Bloody Forest,* Gerald Astor presents oral histories of soldiers and leaders from squad, company, and regimental levels that expose the horrors of war and the utter lack of clear objectives and missions associated with the battle. He particularly wants to place blame on 12th Army Group Commander General Omar Bradley and 1st Army Commander General Courtney Hodges, among others.

Astor repeatedly accentuates senior leaders' inability to conduct

reconnaissance of the battle area or even to gain a sense of what soldiers and junior leaders were up against. Entire units were reporting extremely high causality rates, yet corps and higher headquarters dismissed these reports. The question one asks is, why?

The soldiers' oral histories provide extraordinary insight into the suffering and ingenuity of U.S. soldiers. The high rate of leaders killed, wounded, or missing in action was a clear indicator that something was amiss. The increased cases of battle fatigue and self-inflicted wounds were also indicators that something was not right. As professionals, we can draw numerous inferences from these oral histories and this is what is truly gained from this book.

LTC Billy J. Hadfield, *USA,*
Beavercreek, Ohio

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH JAPAN AND CHINA: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945, Marc S. Gallicchio, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 262 pages, $45.00.

The African American Encounter with Japan and China details the ups and downs of black internationalists' efforts to find a leader of a dark-race internationalism to counter white-race imperialism. The book highlights this little-known race-based philosophy with the other serious black alternative to American nationalism; that is, class-based socialism and communism.

For too long, until the excesses of World War II shocked it into disrepute, race seemed a legitimate defining category; both blacks and whites assumed that race mattered. Black internationalists believed that the oppressed throughout the world shared a common interest, that the dark races could ameliorate domestic conditions by easing white colonialism. When Japan defeated a white power in the Russo-Japanese War, African Americans tried to adopt Japan as the leader of the dark and oppressed, who would lead them into a new world of equality and respect by the white oppressors.

Japan was not an easy model. Aggressively imperialist against other dark-skinned people, Japan allied itself with European supremacists, who then became the enemy. World War II and the Double-V campaign emphasized nationalism against Japan. Blacks turned to China when the Chinese managed despite all logic to hold off the Japanese invaders, but the Chinese were nationalists first, not internationalists. African American relationships with Japan and China proved one-sided. India provided a more practical, nonviolent, passive model for resistance to colonialism, because there was no significant Indian racism.

Black internationalism, as black socialism, was a movement of only a vocal and influential minority within the black community. Mainstream African Americans sought more to prove themselves worthy of justice at home. As others have noted, especially Gerald Astor in *The Right to Fight: A History of African Americans in the Military* (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1998), African Americans have historically demanded the right to serve in America's wars.

It is easy to forget how far blacks have come. It is also easy to take for granted the strides made since World War II. Long forgotten is the harsh fact that logic should have led blacks to turn away from America; it is incredible that they did not. This book is a good reminder that there is nothing inevitable in history that gave us the world we live in and nothing inevitable that says it will stay this way or improve.

John Barnhill, *Yukon, Oklahoma*

SWORD OF THE BORDER, John D. Morris, Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 2000, 348 pages, $35.00.

The War of 1812 merits a footnote in most history texts, and where generals are noted, acknowledgement is limited usually to Andrew Jackson or Winfield Scott. A long-neglected hero of the war, Major General Jacob Brown, has recently been remembered with a full-scale biography. John D. Morris' *Sword of the Border* restores Brown and the Niagara Campaign he commanded to their proper place in history.

Brown, a wealthy landowner from upstate New York, served in the New York militia at the start of the war. His leadership on the Northern Border led to a defensive victory at Sacketts Harbor, and he was commissioned a brigadier general in the regular Army. While commanding the Left Division, Brown was handicapped by poor communications, limited naval support, and ineffective leadership from the War Department.

Morris disputes one of the long-standing myths of the War of 1812 about Scott's Camp of Instruction, which was said to have been directly responsible for the victories at Chippawa and Lundy's Lane. Morris argues that most of Scott's men were nowhere near the camps of instruction. He rightly places Brown back in command at these battles and shows how Brown's decisionmaking process led to victory.

After the war, Brown was retained as one of the remaining major generals, commanding the North, while Andrew Jackson commanded the South. It was not until 1821, after yet another reorganization, that Brown, as the highest ranking officer in the Army, assumed the duties of commanding general, which he held until his death in 1828.

Morris rightly rescues Brown from the obscurity in which he has languished, but more emphasis on the post-war years would have enhanced the book.

LTC James J. Dunphy, *USAR,*
Fairfax, Virginia

THE TAO OF PEACE: Lessons from Ancient China on the Dynamics of Conflict, Wang Chen, Ralph D. Sawyer, ed., Shambhala Publications, Boston, MA, 2000, 220 pages, $22.50.

The Tao of Peace: Lessons from China on the Dynamics of Conflict, edited by Ralph D. Sawyer, is a three-tiered study of the Taoist classic, *Tao Te Ching*, written by Wang Chen in the 9th century. During this period in Chinese history, military command was given to civil servants. To be promoted, applicants took grueling government exams. Thus, Wang Chen was primarily a bureaucrat—an extremely esteemed position. His military lessons were often byproducts of the larger message of how to govern.

Written between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C., *Tao Te Ching* is a short work of less than 5,000 words.

Chen's disgust at warfare's carnage inspired him to search for answers on the nature of conflict. However, he did not turn to the prevailing doctrine of Confucianism for enlightenment. He sought "a method to end warfare and coerce peace amid a world of selfish interests and conflicting desires," which is the basic tenet of Taoism.

Unlike Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (James Avell Claude, ed., Delacorte Press, NY, 1989), *Tao Te Ching* is not about how to fight; it is a prescription for how the "sage" leader should govern. Although Chen does not provide as many military lessons as Sun Tzu provides, his philosophy is an excellent source of insight into the Eastern military thought process.

LCDR David D. Clement, Jr., *USN, Fairfax, Virginia*

UNDER THE SOUTHERN CROSS: Soldier Life with Gordon Bradwell and the Army of Northern Virginia, Pharris DeLoach Johnson, ed., Mercer University Press, Macon, GA, 1999, 271 pages, $32.95.

THIS CRUEL WAR: The Civil War Letters of Grant and Malinda Taylor, Ann K. Blomquist and Robert A. Taylor, eds., Mercer University Press, Macon, GA, 2000, 348 pages, $32.95.

Under the Southern Cross is a compilation of Private Gordon Bradwell's recollections of the Civil War, which he wrote more than 40 years afterward for *Confederate Veteran Magazine*. *This Cruel War* is a collection of the wartime letters written by Grant Taylor and his wife Malinda. Together, these books provide insight into the thoughts, motivations, and range of emotions that affected the daily lives of private soldiers during the Civil War.

Bradwell and Taylor were the sons of small slaveholders, but neither owned slaves. Both were infantry privates who were still in the service at the end of the war, although Taylor was absent without leave (AWOL) and making his way back to his unit when the war ended. Both were deeply religious.

The men had striking differences, however. Bradwell volunteered for the 31st Georgia Infantry at the start of the war. Taylor waited until the passage of the Confederate conscription act in 1862 to enlist in the 40th Alabama Infantry. Bradwell was a veteran of the more prestigious and generally more successful Army of Northern Virginia (ANV). Taylor served in the west, among the garrison of Mobile, the surrendered garrison of Vicksburg, and the troubled Army of Tennessee. Perhaps more significant was that Bradwell was a single man. Taylor left a wife and children in Alabama, so Bradwell was a much more willing soldier than was Taylor, who twice went AWOL.

Bradwell enlisted enthusiastically in 1861 and participated in most of the ANV's major battles. Writing 40 years or more after the end of the war, Bradwell heaped abuse on the memory of President Abraham Lincoln because of his conduct and that of Federal officers during the war. Bradwell's ruminations must be taken with some caution, however, because he was under the influence of the glorification of the Lost Cause. However, it cannot be denied that Bradwell served the Confederacy with devotion, courage, and constancy.

What emerges from these books is an unvarnished picture of the life of Confederate infantrymen. If Bradwell's articles come across as idealized, he can be forgiven for his lack of objectivity; he was an old veteran reminiscing. If Taylor's letters are the unpolished laments of an unwilling soldier, they are thoroughly authentic. I recommend both books to voracious readers of Civil War historiography.

MAJ D. Jonathan White, *USA, Smithfield, Virginia*

EARLY CAROLINGIAN WARFARE: Prelude to Empire, Bernard S. Bachrach, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2000, 413 pages, $55.00.

In *Early Carolingian Warfare*, which is part of a series on the Middle Ages, Bernard S. Bachrach examines 8th-century European military thinking that preceded Charlemagne's misnamed "Holy Roman Empire." When visualizing medieval armies, many people envision a howling mob of farmers charging mindlessly at another howling mob of farmers; Bachrach details the organization behind the image.

Religion was used as ideology; that is, their motivation for war was not to gain land but to promote their religious beliefs—a practice so successful it continues today. Therefore motivation was an important part of military operations. Aside from the explanation of medieval military organization, this book demonstrates that war is a constant—only technology changes.

K.L. Jamison, *Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri*

MORALS UNDER THE GUN: The Cardinal Virtues, Military Ethics, and American Society, James H. Toner, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2000, 256 pages, $29.95.

Events of the recent past remind us that personal and professional ethics must concern every soldier, especially those entrusted with leadership responsibilities. The Army has always taught ethics, but has been unable to make people ethical. Is there a standard that transcends all times and cultures? If so, which one? Or, are standards personal, cultural, or time-bound?

In *Morals under the Gun*, James Toner examines these issues, addresses the place of ethics in the military and the challenge to ethics in U.S. society, and proposes a solution. Toner, a professor at the Air War College and a former Army officer, approaches ethics from a traditional Roman Catholic perspective, proposing a virtue ethic to redress the weakness he sees in current values training.

To reach Toner's argument, the reader must get past the first chapter. I recommend skipping it entirely. Written from the perspective of moral relativism, the chapter is a deliberate provocation. Only in the next chapter does Toner admit this, then introduces his own approach.

All ethics derive from transcendental moral norms. This means ethics is about applying absolutes to individual or cultural situations. To prevent his ethical position from being dismissed as religious and thus irrelevant to secular society and inappropriate for teaching in the military, Toner argues from natural law and suggests that the classic virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance are foundational to character development and value systems. Divorced from virtues, values have been used to support all sorts

of agendas, although Toner argues values divorced from virtues are not values at all. Toner's appeal to natural law appropriates virtue's strengths but does not address objections raised against it as a source for ethics.

Toner advocates virtue ethics because it emphasizes "being" over "doing." Who we are determines how we will act, so the surest way to alter conduct is to transform the individual. This is easier said than done, and Toner recognizes this. He suggests an eight-step program to improve the military's ethical climate. These suggestions are attractive, but most can only be implemented by senior officers.

Officers lacking a virtuous character will be military failures because they will be human failures, says Toner. He insists personal and professional ethics are linked, so personal and professional behavior must be consistent, especially for leaders. Toner does distinguish between momentary and habitual ethical failures, however, and reinforces his argument with case studies in contemporary military ethics.

Toner's religious stance is obvious, but by offering a classical virtue ethics argument, he ensures his argument does not depend on it. He avoids the weaknesses of traditional virtue ethics while retaining its strengths. He has not done as well in justifying his appeal to natural law, however.

This is a thoughtful, competent work, but it is not the best book available on military ethics. However, the endnotes and bibliography are excellent resources for further study.

CH (COL) Douglas McCready,
ARNG, Roslyn, Pennsylvania

MR Letters

No Objective Assessment

Although no journal owes a book a favorable review, it does have an obligation to offer an objective assessment. In his review of my book, *Men of Secession and Civil War* (Scholarly Resources Books, Wilmington, DE, 2000), Major D. Jonathan White describes my claims about the secessionists' motives and methods as being "admirably" laid out. If he meant that statement, he must surely accept at least two things: where the responsibility for secession lies and the nature of the irresponsible distortions used to promote it.

Unwilling to acknowledge that Southern radicalism played the major role in secession, White tries to establish a sort of moral equivalence between the "extremists" of the North and South to whom he attributes equal responsibility for disunion. In that light, White charges that, except for John Brown, I ignored the secessionists' Northern "counterparts."

Did White miss my description of the abolitionists, who for the most part were pacifists; Salmon Chase; and the ideology of the Republican Party? For that matter, does he not know that secessionists described U.S. President Abraham Lincoln—the subject of a chapter in my book—as a dangerous radical? Nor would they trust the Pro-Southern Stephen Douglas, another of my book's principal subjects. If, Brown excepted, Northern politicians sound too moderate for White's taste, perhaps his problem is the North's relative lack of influential men who were hot to destroy the Union or wage violent war on slavery.

Because I do not equally apportion responsibility for a national calamity, White accuses me of writing from a "Northern perspective" and waffles by slamming my work as "somewhat scholarly but partisan." Presenting reasoned conclusions that differ from his opinions is not alone evidence of bias.

Apparently eager to justify secession, White ignores the book's attention to the Southerners who resisted secession; Lincoln's moderation; the Deep South's unwillingness to consider compromise; the Montgomery Convention's assault on state's rights and representative government; and the unelected Confederate government's eagerness to initiate war and expand the Confederacy by attacking Fort Sumter. Which of us, do you suppose, is biased or writing from a "perspective"?

James L. Abrahamson,
Pittsboro, North Carolina

White's Rebuttal

It is not my intention to turn the letters to the editor page of *Military Review* into a forum on the causes and effects of the American Civil War. James L. Abrahamson's rather emotional comments of my review of his book demand clarification.

In my review I did not say that Southern radicals bore no blame for causing the secession crisis. Clearly they did. I said that Abrahamson under-represents the impact of Northern radicalism. Northern radicals in the late 1850s and early 1860s were increasingly willing to violate clear provisions of the U.S. Constitution in their efforts to abolish slavery. This manifested itself in the so-called personal liberty laws, which, while morally sound to modern sensibilities, were intended to violate Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution.

Southerners were troubled by Northern support and funding of John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. Following the raid, some Northern states officials refused to comply with Article IV, Section 2, on rendition of fugitives from justice and to extradite those implicated in the conspiracy. This indicated official Northern states *post facto* endorsement of Brown's actions. Public approval of Brown's actions and outrage at his execution, which prominent Northern citizens voiced, presented an image of a North united in using any means to abolish slavery, including the most indiscriminate and violent.

Northern insistence that slaveholders be excluded from territories was contrary to the Southern view on the limited powers of the Federal government. With the exception of Brown's raid, Abrahamson omits or gives these constitutional issues slight notice.

I believe most Southerners shared Robert Barnwell Rhett's view that

constitutions exist, in part, to protect the rights of the minority. The cumulative effect of Northern violations of the Constitution caused Southerners to conclude that constitutional protections of minority rights would not be respected under the Northern majority. This fear would seem especially likely once Northerners controlled the White House, both houses of Congress, and eventually, the U.S Supreme Court. Given the potential horrendous impact of how Northern antislavery could manifest itself (that is, a successful slave revolt on a scale and ferocity of Haiti in 1802), secession should not have been a surprising response.

Two other observations are of note. Strict compliance with the provisions of the Constitution—even the distasteful portions—is the duty of those who take the oath to support and defend it. From 1859 to 1861, radicals on both sides failed to do this. Also, strict compliance with the provisions of the Constitution might have moderated the passions of the day and given statesmen another opportunity to resolve the crisis without violence.

I stand by my assessment that *Men of Secession and Civil War* is an admirable exposition of one side of the crisis. Abrahamson seems to have lost sight of the fact that, while slavery was unequivocally wrong, not all antislavery actions were good.

Major D. Jonathan White, *USA,*
Waynesboro, Virginia

Editor's note: In Major Tom James's November-December 2001 article "The Transformation of U.S. Air Power," the second and third sentences of paragraph 3 on page 70 should read, "Thompson explores a less normative vein than does Lambeth, concentrating *more on facts than conjecture.* The final chapter, which correlates with Air Force operations in the 1990s, suggests some lessons for the aspiring military strategist."

Paragraph 9, page 70, should read, "Lambeth and Thompson can easily be described as *being* members of, *or being closely associated with,* the Air Force establishment. To their credit, both quite openly and actively solicit review and input from interservice and political experts. In an effort to ensure his book provides a fair, accurate depiction of his subject, Lambeth *put* his work *through* an especially grueling, pre-publication shakedown. *Unfortunately, the* effort was less than successful."

The beginning of paragraph 5, page 71, should read, "His assertion that air and space assets 'continue to be viewed as support for surface forces' establishes his own straw man *accusation,* with merit, to counter the purported argument that the Air Force cannot guarantee success in all military situations as an independent force."

The first sentence of paragraph 10, page 71, should read, "Lambeth offers insight into the problems of labeling air power targets in classical strategic, *operational,* and tactical terms based on platforms and spatial relation in the area of operations instead of on their desired operational efforts."

The bio should read "Major *Thomas* James *is* a corps *planner, U.S. Army Space Operations Office, Fort Hood, Texas.*"